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INTRODUCTION

This paper highlights aspects of the approach taken in the
1
Restatement (Third) of Torts (Third Restatement) to problems of
uncertain factual causation, and makes some comparative
observations on them from a European perspective, referring both
2
to national legal provisions and the two texts drafted with a view to
a possible future harmonisation of tort law in Europe—specifically,
the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) and the Draft
3
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR).
“Uncertain factual
causation” here refers to cases where the evidence from which the
existence of a factual causal nexus might be assessed is weak, and
does not allow for inferences to be drawn either way with
confidence. Depending on the standard of proof employed in the
legal system in question, this may include cases where causation
would currently be established. For the purposes of the analysis
advanced below, it will be useful to distinguish between two
situations: “alternative-defendants” and “uncertain torts.”
In
alternative-defendant cases, one or more of a number of
wrongdoers is known to have caused the claimant’s injury, but
which wrongdoer’s(s’) conduct was in fact causal is unknown. In
uncertain-tort cases, one or more of the possible causes is a risk for
which no wrongdoer is responsible (i.e., a risk in the victim’s
sphere) so it cannot be concluded with confidence that the
4
plaintiff was the victim of a tort at all.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
(2010).
2. The law of the European Union regarding causation is relatively
undeveloped and will not be addressed here. For more information on this
subject, see Isabelle C. Durant, Causation, in 23 TORT LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 47 (Helmut Koziol & Reiner Schulze eds., 2008).
3. See EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW:
TEXT & COMMENTARY (2005) [hereinafter PETL], available at http://www.egtl.org
/Principles/index.htm (text only); STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE &
EUROPEAN RESEARCH GROUP ON EXISTING EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, PRINCIPLES,
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME
OF REFERENCE (DCFR): FULL EDITION (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009)
[hereinafter DCFR]. Note that the author became a member of the European
Group on Tort Law in 2009, though he was not involved in the formulation or the
2005 publication of the Group’s PETL.
4. For the purposes of the present paper, it is not necessary to subdivide this
category into cases of multiple possible victims of tortious conduct, where it is
known that the defendant must have harmed some of the victims, but not known
which ones, and cases where there is only one possible victim of the tortious
conduct. For present purposes, “tortious conduct” means conduct that would give
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The comparative analysis presented in this article will
demonstrate that problems of uncertain factual causation afflict all
legal systems, and have widely been considered to warrant the
adoption of exceptional rules so as to avoid the unacceptable
outcomes that would otherwise arise. Lawyers everywhere can learn
useful lessons from the practical experiences of other jurisdictions
in developing such approaches.
II.

UNCERTAIN FACTUAL CAUSATION IN THE THIRD
RESTATEMENT

This Section will selectively highlight aspects of the Third
Restatement insofar as it deals with uncertain factual causation,
rather than comprehensively addressing its approach to causation
as a whole. The selection of issues is designed to set the scene for
and facilitate the comparative analysis in the next Section of this
paper.
A. Factual Causation in General
By way of preliminary to the more detailed consideration of
alternative-defendants and uncertain-cause scenarios below, various
aspects of the Third Restatement’s general approach to factual
causation may be highlighted for the purposes of comparative
analysis. Dealing first with substantive law, the Third Restatement
is notable for its two-stage approach to questions of causation, in
which issues of “factual cause” (§§ 26–28) are separated from those
of “proximate cause” or “scope of liability” (§ 29 ff). Though the
two-stage approach has long been entrenched in academic
5
textbooks and judicial decisions, the previous Restatements took a
different course, employing a single concept of “legal cause.” This
embraced all the various aspects of the inquiry into causality,
including the “substantial factor” test, which was the practical
6
mechanism by which causation in fact was addressed. The Third
rise to liability in tort if harm were to result from it, while “wrongdoer” means a
person engaging in such conduct, whether it involves fault or not.
5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 26 cmt. a (2010).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 9, 431(a) (1965); RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 9 cmt. b, 431(a) (1934). The concept of cause in fact was
actually introduced into Restatement (Second) of Torts in the course of its
revision in the 1970s, though only in the Comments, and in relatively narrow
contexts; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
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Restatement also departs from the approach of the previous
restatements by abandoning the language of “substantial cause”
and including in its place a positive definition of factual cause:
“Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have
7
occurred absent the conduct.”
The Third Restatement
commentary suggests that the earlier restatements omitted the
“but-for” standard from the black letter text, confining it to a
8
comment, and so “lowered its profile.” However, the Restatement
(First) of Torts (First Restatement) and Restatement (Second) of
Torts (Second Restatement) did include the “but-for” test in their
black letter, but in a negatively—rather than positively—worded
form: “the actor’s negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been
9
sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.” The change
effected in the Third Restatement is not therefore a total novelty,
though it undoubtedly introduces greater clarity.
Turning to matters of evidence and proof, the Third
Restatement maintains the established approach by which the
burden of proving factual causation generally rests on the plaintiff
10
and the standard of proof is the preponderance of the evidence.
By way of exception, the burden of proof is reversed in the
alternative-defendants scenario considered below.
These different aspects—substantive and evidential—will be
addressed in the comparative analysis in Section III. The present
Section continues by addressing the approach of the Third
Restatement in the two situations of uncertain factual causation
HARM § 26 cmt. a (2010). For criticism of the “amalgam” nature of legal cause in
the previous Restatements, and a plea to the reporters of the Third Restatement to
“unpack” the concept so as to separate its factual and normative aspects, see Jane
Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54
VAND. L. REV. 941 (2001).
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
26 (2010); see also Joseph Sanders, William C. Powers Jr. & Michael D. Green, The
Insubstantiality of the “Substantial Factor” Test for Causation, 73 MO. L. REV. 399, 420
(2008).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
26 cmt. b (2010) (referring to the Restatement (First) of Torts (1934) and
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431
cmt. a (1965).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(1) (1965); see RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1934).
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§§ 28(a), 28 cmt. a (2010) (repeating in substance what was provided in
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(1)).
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identified at the start of this paper, namely alternative-defendants
and uncertain torts.
B. Alternative-Defendants
As mentioned above, a special rule providing for the reversal
of the burden of proof in alternative-defendants cases was
11
introduced in the Second Restatement, following the well-known
12
case of Summers v. Tice. The Third Restatement maintains the
burden-shifting approach, though in slightly different words; the
new formulation clarifies that the burden of proof is reversed only
where all persons whose tortious acts exposed the plaintiff to a risk
of harm are joined as defendants:
When the plaintiff sues all of multiple actors and proves
that each engaged in tortious conduct that exposed the
plaintiff to a risk of harm and that the tortious conduct of
one or more of them caused the plaintiff’s harm but the
plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to prove which
actor or actors caused the harm, the burden of proof,
including both production and persuasion, on factual
13
causation is shifted to the defendants.
A key feature of “alternative liability,” as it is commonly known,
is its retention of the traditional all-or-nothing outcome.
Proportional-liability (i.e., liability measured by the proportion of
the total risk that is attributable to the individual defendant) has
been recognised in several states in the years after the Second
14
Restatement under the “market–share” theory. But market-share
liability is rejected in a roughly equal number of states, and this
nearly even split between jurisdictions, combined with the lack of
any emerging consensus or trend, was considered to have made it
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965) (“Where the conduct
of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the
plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused
it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the
harm.”).
12. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948); see also Rutherford v. Owens-Ill.
Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28(b) (2010); see also id. § 28 illus. 2, 6–12. To review the requirement of joinder
of all defendants, see id. § 28 cmt. h.
14. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). For consideration of
the relationship between alternative-liability and market-share theories, see Mark
A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market-Share Liability, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 447 (2006).
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inappropriate to include any reference to market-share liability in
the black letter of the Third Restatement; it was thought preferable
15
to leave the matter to the developing law.
An as-yet unresolved question is whether alternative liability
can be invoked by a plaintiff who was culpably engaged in conduct
that exposed himself or herself to the same risk of harm, and was
also therefore a possible cause of the harm.
The Third
Restatement explicitly takes no position on this issue, noting the
16
absence of any significant case law addressing it.
These two unresolved issues (market-share liability and the
application of alternative liability where the claimant was also at
fault) will be considered further in the comparative analysis in
Section III.
C. Uncertain Torts
As already noted, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
17
The
factual causation by a preponderance of the evidence.
plaintiff must satisfy the fact-finder that the defendant’s tortious
conduct was a more likely cause of the injury than all the other,
innocent factors that might possibly have caused the injury
18
instead. If the fact-finder concludes that an innocent factor was
more likely (or equally likely) a cause of the injury than the
defendant’s tortious conduct, the plaintiff will have failed to satisfy
19
the burden of persuasion. The Third Restatement illustrates this
by reference to a case of an infant suffering from a bacterial
infection who receives a routine vaccination, and shortly afterwards
20
goes into respiratory arrest and dies.
On the assumption that
either the infection or the vaccine was the cause of death, but not
the two in combination, the claim brought by the infant’s estate will
fail unless the fact-finder concludes that the vaccine was more likely
21
the cause than the infection.
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. p (2010).
16. Id. § 28 cmt. o.
17. Id. § 28 cmt. a.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 26 illus. 4–5.
21. Id.; see also Shyface v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 165 F.3d 1344 (Fed.
Cir. 1999). The evidential difficulties may be particularly pronounced in toxicsubstance cases, to which an illuminating new comment is dedicated in section 28
comment c of the Third Restatement.
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The Third Restatement reveals a measure of confidence that
injustices can be avoided—or at least mitigated—by a liberal
22
approach to causal inference, and by the reversal of the burden of
proof in cases of negligence per se and failure to warn, separately
from the specific provision made with respect to alternative
23
liability. However, it provides for no reversal of the burden of
proof in ordinary “single-defendant” scenarios, the commentary
24
noting that this is not customary judicial practice in such cases.
Whether the alternative and single-defendant situations should be
distinguished so categorically is perhaps questionable.
The
justification for the burden-shifting entailed by alternative liability
rests on the injustice of putting the “risk of error” on the innocent
claimant rather than the culpable defendants, and the same
injustice exists to some extent in the single-defendant scenario.
But the Third Restatement prefers to rely upon a flexible approach
to the drawing of inferences from the evidence: “the flexibility
afforded in the standard for the burden of production on factual
causation . . . enables courts to submit a case to a jury when the
plaintiff has made a plausible, if ambiguous and circumstantial,
25
case for causation.” It is the lack of comparable flexibility in the
alternative-defendant scenario—where it is impossible to infer that
any particular defendant was more likely than not the cause—that
justifies the exceptional reversal of the burden of proof in such
26
cases.
In the last thirty years, a substantial scholarly literature in the
United States has argued for a different approach, namely
27
proportional-liability, in uncertain-cause cases. However, neither
22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 cmt. b reporters’ note (2010) (discussing how uncertainty can be
managed through the flexibility of the line between reasonable inference and
impermissible speculation).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 28 cmt. g.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (1982); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic
Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1987); Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation,
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future
Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
417 (1984); Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691 (1990); John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive
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the theory, nor the published work that supports it, is paid much
attention in the Third Restatement; nowhere are the pros and cons
28
of proportional-liability squarely addressed.
Instead, the Third
Restatement, following the pattern of state decisions, focuses on
only one species of proportional-liability approach—the award of
29
damages for loss-of-chance. A comment correctly observes that
the doctrine does not strictly entail a modification of the principles
30
of factual causation; “rather, it reconceptualizes the harm.” It is
functionally
equivalent
to
the
recognition
of
other
“reconceptualized harms” (e.g., spoliation of evidence) in order to
sidestep difficulties of proving a causal link with what would
31
traditionally have been regarded as the injury. In practice, the
loss-of-chance theory has been limited to cases of medical
32
malpractice, and the Third Restatement expressly refrains from
Rule to Apportion Tort Damages Based On Probability, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1063 (1989);
Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA.
L. REV. 713 (1982); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:
A ‘Public Law’ Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Christopher H.
Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439
(1990). It should be noted that the cited works differ considerably in specifics and
in their degree of enthusiasm for proportional-liability.
For criticism of
proportional-liability, see Michael D. Green, The Future of Proportional Liability: The
Lessons of Toxic Substances Causation, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 352 (M. Stuart
Madden ed., 2005); David A. Fischer, Proportional Liability: Statistical Evidence and
the Probability Paradox, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1201 (1993); Shmuel Leshem & Geoffrey P.
Miller, All-or-Nothing versus Proportionate Damages, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (2009).
28. Some of the literature is cited in the comments and the reporters’ notes,
but mostly for rather narrow propositions. For example, Levmore, supra note 27,
is cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 26 cmt. n (2010) (dealing with loss-of-chance) for an explanation of why
proportional-liability provides superior deterrence in situations of recurring
wrongs where the victims cannot generally satisfy the preponderance-of-theevidence standard, but the commentary fails to note that Levmore’s argument is
valid for proportional-liability generally, and not just under the loss-of-chance
theory.
29. See generally David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 605 (2001) (discussing the potential to broaden the application of
the loss-of-chance theory of causation); Steven R. Koch, Whose Loss is it Anyway?
Effects of the “Lost-Chance” Doctrine on Civil Litigation and Medical Malpractice
Insurance, 88 N.C. L. REV. 595 (2010) (supporting adoption of the loss-of-chance
doctrine).
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
26 cmt. f (2010).
31. Id.; see also David W. Robertson, Causation in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Three Arguable Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1012–14 (2009).
32. The reporters’ notes observe that twenty states and the District of
Columbia have recognized the doctrine in medical malpractice cases, while ten
states have rejected it. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
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addressing whether there are others areas to which it might
33
appropriately be extended, leaving this to future development.
The Third Restatement notes difficulties with the loss-of-chance
analysis (e.g., the coherence of treating the loss of the chance as
harm is a claim that can only be brought if, and when, the physical
34
injury occurs), but does not consider whether and to what extent
such difficulties could be avoided by reliance on theories of
proportional-liability that do not involve a reconceptualization of
the damage.
The comparative analysis below (Section III) will address the
various approaches that have been adopted in European systems to
deal with uncertain torts, including not just the reversal of the
burden of proof and the award of damages for loss-of-chance, but
also the introduction of proportional-liability by way of
modification to the orthodox rules of factual causation rather than
reconceptualization of what constitutes actionable harm.
III. COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON UNCERTAIN FACTUAL
35
CAUSATION
A. Factual Causation in General
As in Section II above, it will be useful to preface discussion of
alternative-defendants and uncertain torts with some general
observations about uncertain factual causation in European
systems. First, as a matter of substantive law, all European systems
recognize a requirement that the tortious conduct should be a
36
conditio sine qua non of the plaintiff’s injury, though it appears that
EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 reporters’ note (2010) (citing Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890
N.E.2d 819, 828 n. 23 (Mass. 2008)).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
26 cmt. n (2010). The same comment notes:
Without limits, this reform is of potentially enormous scope, implicating
a large swath of tortious conduct in which there is uncertainty about
factual cause, including failures to warn, to provide rescue or safety
equipment, and otherwise to take precautions to protect a person from a
risk of harm that exists.
Id.
34. Id.
35. As to the general approach of European systems to uncertain factual
causes, see WALTER VAN GERVEN, JEREMY LEVER & PIERRE LAROUCHE, CASES,
MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW §
4.2 (2000), and CEES VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 281–90 (2006).
36. Reinhard Zimmermann, Conditio Sine Qua Non in General: Comparative
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nowhere is this formally laid down by way of legislative definition;
in some systems it may be regarded as too self-evident to require
38
discussion.
By contrast, the Principles of European Tort Law
(PETL) propose a formal definition reminiscent of that in the
Third Restatement, section 26:
Art. 3:101. Conditio sine qua non
An activity or conduct (hereinafter activity) is a cause of
the victim’s damage if, in the absence of the activity, the
39
damage would not have occurred.
40
Like most European systems, the PETL clearly distinguish this
factual issue from the normative question of the scope of liability
for consequences, variously referred to by such terms as
“remoteness of damage” (in common law systems) or “adequacy”
(especially in the Germanic systems). In fact, the PETL treat every
conditio sine qua non as a cause, and deal separately with restrictions
41
on the scope of liability for consequences. This approach chimes
with that adopted in the Third Restatement, and seems conducive
to greater clarity of analysis than is possible when these separate
42
issues are lumped together under a single notion.
Report, in 1 ESSENTIAL CASES ON NATURAL CAUSATION, DIGEST OF EUROPEAN TORT
LAW § 1/29 para. 1 (Bénédict Winiger, Helmut Koziol, Bernhard A. Koch &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2007) [hereinafter DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION]. In
the common law systems, the “but for” test is applied:
If you can say that the damage would not have happened but for a
particular fault, then that fault is in fact a cause of the damage; but if you
can say that the damage would have happened just the same, fault or no
fault, then the fault is not a cause of the damage.
Cork v. Kirby Maclean Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 402 (C.A.) 407 (Denning LJ) (U.K.);
see also Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Authority, [1987] A.C. 750 (H.L.)
788 (Lord Mackay) (U.K.). The continental systems do not use the “but for”
formulation, but the test of a conditio sine qua non is essentially the same: “the
difference is merely one of terminology, not one of substance.” DIGEST: NATURAL
CAUSATION, supra, § 1/29 para. 1.
37. DFCR, supra note 3, art. 4:101 cmt. 3.
38. DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, § 1/29 para. 2.
39. PETL, supra note 3, art. 3:101.
40. See VAN DAM, supra note 35, at 270, 275. France and some other systems
remain resistant to systematic attempts to distinguish different causal concepts and
a largely intuitive approach is said to prevail; see the classic article by P. Esmein, Le
Nez De Cléopâtre Ou Les Affres De La Causalité, D. 1964, I, 205.
41. PETL, supra note 3, art. 3:201.
42. As with the notion of “legal cause” in the First and Second Restatements,
and as under article 4:101(1) of the DCFR, which provides: “A person causes
legally relevant damage to another if the damage is to be regarded as a
consequence of: (a) that person’s conduct; or (b) a source of danger for which
that person is responsible.” This definition is somewhat circular, but insofar as it
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Secondly, like other elements of the claim, the claimant must
43
normally prove factual causation.
The standard of proof,
however, varies considerably among systems, and in many
44
jurisdictions a standard that is apparently more onerous than the
common law’s balance of probabilities or preponderance of the
45
46
evidence is applied. In France, the evaluation of factual evidence
falls within the “sovereign discretion” (appreciation souveraine) of the
judges of first instance. Formally, proof of facts is subject to rather
rigorous requirements. In civil matters, the judge can generally
consider a fact to be established only insofar as its existence has
been shown by one of the methods of proof fixed by law, namely,
written evidence, oral testimony, presumptions, confession or
47
oath. In the present context, proof by way of presumption is of
greatest significance: in the absence of any presumption arising by
operation of law, the judge must be personally convinced of the
48
existence of a “certain and direct” causal connection on the basis
of serious, precise and concurrent presumptions (présomptions
avoids circularity it seems to focus on the normative question of the scope of the
consequences for which liability can fairly be attributed to the defendant—
through the formulation “if the damage is to be regarded as a consequence”—and
makes no mention at all of the (factual) sine qua non standard. DCFR, supra note
3, art. 4:101(1).
43. See Ivo Giesen, The Burden of Proof and Other Procedural Devices in Tort Law,
in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, at 49, 53–55 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger
eds., 2009); Vibe Ulfbeck & Marie-Louise Holle, Tort Law and Burden of Proof—
Comparative Aspects. A Special Case for Enterprise Liability?, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW
2008, supra, at 26, 28–29. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A
Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 (2002) (chronicling
the difference between standards of proof in civil versus common law
jurisdictions); Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, 33 VT. L. REV. 469
(2009) (discussing application of standards of proof to evidence) [hereinafter
Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited]; Christoph Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence
Versus Intime Conviction: A Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict Between American and
Continental European Law, 33 VT. L. REV. 435 (2009) (explaining the distinctions
between American and Continental law); Michele Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards
of Proof, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 659 (2003) (critiquing Clermont and Sherwin’s article).
44. For an argument that the difference between the approaches is more
apparent than real, see Richard W. Wright, Proving Facts: Belief Versus Probability, in
EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, supra note 43, at 79.
45. For statements of this standard in English law, see Morgan v. Sim, (1857)
14 Eng. Rep. 712 (P.C.); Miller v. Minister of Pensions, [1947] 2 All E.R. 372
(K.B.) 374 (Denning J).
46. See generally Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 43, at 247–51; LARA KHOURY,
UNCERTAIN CAUSATION IN MEDICAL LIABILITY 37–38 (2006).
47. Claude Giverdon, The Problem of Proof in French Civil Law, 31 TUL. L. REV.
29, 31–32 (1956) (citing CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1316).
48. VAN DAM, supra note 35, at 278.
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graves, précises et concordantes) drawn from known facts.
Notwithstanding the apparent stringency of these requirements,
the judge’s sovereign discretion gives considerable scope for a
relatively relaxed approach to the inference of causal connections
50
in practice. German law also provides for free evaluation of the
51
evidence (freie Beweiswürdigung) by the judge possessed of the case.
The court must decide on the basis of its full conviction (nach freier
Überzeugung) whether every alleged fact is true or untrue, and this
cannot be reduced to a mere assessment of probabilities: even a
very high probability in the veracity of the factual allegations will
52
not be enough if the judge remains in substantial doubt. The
impression therefore remains that this is a more exacting standard
than the common law’s preponderance of probabilities.
In fact, at one level it is impossible to compare the approaches
to proof of common law and civil law systems, as proof is
conceptualized in radically different ways: whereas the common law
aspires to objectivity through express reliance on probabilities,
civilian systems understand proof as a strictly subjective impression
53
in the mind of the trier of fact. Ultimately, the importance of the
difference between the verbal formulations employed may lie in
54
their psychological impact on the fact-finder: the requirement of a
conviction in the truth of the alleged fact predisposes the factfinder to be less tolerant of erroneous findings of liability (false
positives) than erroneous exculpations (false negatives), and such
standards tilt the playing field against plaintiffs as the parties
55
Cutting against this,
typically bearing the burden of proof.
however, is the sovereign discretion or free evaluation which
civilian systems delegate to the trier of fact and the way in which
recourse to the judge’s personal conviction acts as “a sort of black
box,” allowing judges to act according to their conscience without
49.
50.
51.

CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1353; see KHOURY, supra note 46, at 43–45.
KHOURY, supra note 46, at 37–38.
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] Jan. 30, 1877,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL. 1], as amended, § 286.
52. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 17, 1970, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 946, 1970; see also MARC STAUCH, THE LAW OF
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 65 (2008)
(citing the example of section 286 of the Code of Civil Procedure); Engel, supra
note 43, at 440–41; cf. Taruffo, supra note 43, at 667–68.
53. Engel, supra note 43, at 436. For criticism of the cogency of this
distinction, see Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, supra note 43, at 477–86.
54. Engel, supra note 43, at 436, 448–67.
55. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, supra note 43, at 476, 485–86.
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having to explain the reasons supporting their decision.
An
obvious parallel exists here with the role of the jury under
American civil procedure.
B. Alternative-Defendants
Compared with the Second and Third Restatements, many
European jurisdictions include specific provisions in their civil
codes to deal with alternative-defendant cases. The German Civil
57
Code may be cited as representative: “[i]f more than one person
has caused damage by a jointly committed tort, then each of them
is responsible for the damage. The same applies if it cannot be
established which of several persons involved caused the damage by
his act.”
The first sentence of the code deals with joint tortfeasors. The
second allows for liability in an alternative-defendant case where
each of a number of wrongdoers acted tortiously and there is no
doubt that at least one of them caused the claimant’s harm, but it
cannot be established which of them, singly or jointly, actually
caused the harm.
It applies where the wrongdoers act
independently, since otherwise the case would fall within the first
58
sentence dealing with joint torts. The effect of the provision is to
reverse the burden of proof: once the plaintiff has proved that the
56. Taruffo, supra note 43, at 667. Taruffo posits that French law offers
considerably greater scope for this than German law. Id. at 667–68.
57. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896,
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL. 1] at 195, in the revised version of Jan. 2, 2002,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL. 1] at 42, as amended, § 830, para. 1 (Ger.), available at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#BGBengl_000P830
(last visited Jan. 24, 2011). In addition to Germany, see also Võlaõigusseadus [Law
of Obligations], § 138(1) (Est.), available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt
/121122010034#para141 (last visited Apr. 2, 2011); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL
CODE] 2:926 (Greece) (second sentence); Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civil Code] §
6:99 (Neth.), available at http://www.wetboek-online.nl/wet/Burgerlijk%20Wetboek
%20Boek%206/99.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2011); Zakonik [OZ] § 186(3)
(Slovn.), available at http://www.dz-rs.si/index.php?id=101 (last visited Jan. 24,
2011). The BGB’s influence in China is evident in a comparable provision in the
Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China. See 民法 [Civil Law] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) §
10, available at 2009 China Law LEXIS 668. Although Austria has no comparable
provision in its civil code, Austrian law has reached the same result by a process of
analogical reasoning. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
58. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 1, 1957,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 25 (271)
(Ger.). English extracts may be found in VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 35, §
4.G.43.
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defendant was one of a group of (independent) wrongdoers and
may have caused the damage, it is for the defendant to prove that he
or she did not in fact do so. The liability, where it results, is
59
solidary. A simple example is where two children were throwing
stones, one of which hit the victim in the eye, and it was not known
60
which child threw the stone in question. The German provision is
construed relatively narrowly, and excludes, for example, cases
where there is a possibility that the harm may have been caused by
61
the victim’s own act or may have come from an innocent source.
France and the French-inspired systems (notably Belgium and
Spain) have no equivalent provision in their civil codes and take a
different approach, circumventing the difficulty of providing
causation by relying on principles of attribution of responsibility for
the acts of another person on the basis of common activity. For
example, in some systems, children playing together and throwing
stones have been found to have jointly engaged in a dangerous
activity causing injury, and held liable on a joint and several basis
even though it could not be shown whose stone had struck the
62
victim. A related liability is based on the collective guardianship
of things (garde collective) in respect of which strict liability arises in
63
France under Art. 1384 of the Code civil. The classic hunters case
is solved by reasoning that the hunters have collective control of
64
As
the guns and bullets from which the “guilty” bullet came.
59. CIVIL CODE [BGB], supra note 57, § 840 (Ger.).
60. RECHTSPRECHUNG DER OBERLANDESGERICHTE IN ZIVILSACHEN [OLGZ]
[Higher Regional Court of Justice] July 13, 1950, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 951, 2008 (Ger.).
61. Gerhard Wagner, Aggregation and Divisibility of Damage in Germany: Tort
Law and Insurance, in AGGREGATION AND DIVISIBILITY OF DAMAGE 195 (Ken Oliphant
ed., 2009).
62. In France, see Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters], 2e civ., Mar. 8, 1968, Bull. civ. II, No. 76 (Fr.); in Belgium, see I. Durant,
Damage Caused by Less Than All Possibly Harmful Events Outside the Victim’s Sphere:
Belgium, in DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, § 6a/7 (citing Hof van
Beroep [HvB] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelle, Dec. 23, 1927, REVUE GÉNÉRALE DES
ASSURANCES ET DES RESPONSABILITÉS [RGAR] 1928, 227 (Belg.)); in Spain, see J.
Ribot & A. Ruda, Damage Caused by Less Than All Possibly Harmful Events Outside the
Victim’s Sphere: Spain, in DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, § 6a/10 (citing
S.T.S., Feb. 8, 1983 (R.J., p. 867) (Spain); S.T.S., July 8, 1988 (R.J., p. 5681)
(Spain)).
63. See generally G. VINEY & P. JOURDAIN, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL: LES
CONDITIONS DE LA RESPONSABILITE § 366 (2nd ed., 2003).
64. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 2e civ.,
Mar. 13, 1975, Bull. civ. II, No. 88 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000006993731&fas
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under the code provisions cited above, the effect is to create a
presumption of causation against multiple possible defendants,
even when proof of individual causation is impossible. But the
common-activity and collective-guardianship approaches are
necessarily limited in scope, because they generally require an
element of geographical and/or temporal proximity, so liability
does not arise in the hunters scenario where the two hunters were
standing some distance apart and fired quite separate rounds of
65
shot.
English law has never had a hunters case, and came to address
the liability of alternative-defendants relatively late in the day. In
66
2002, in Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services, the House of Lords
was faced with a case of mesothelioma from occupational exposure
67
to asbestos. The defendants were the employers responsible for
the exposure at various times. Because of mesothelioma’s long
latency period and scientific uncertainty about its aetiology, it
could not be proved on the balance of probabilities that any
68
particular defendant had caused an individual victim’s condition.
The Law Lords nevertheless found all the defendants liable on the
basis of their material contribution through their tortious conduct
69
to the risk of the cancer. They considered that the injustice of
imposing liability on a defendant without proof that he had caused
the claimant’s injury was “heavily outweighed by the injustice of
denying redress to a victim” who had undoubtedly been injured by
the materialisation of a risk to which each defendant had
70
wrongfully contributed. Further, an insistence on an orthodox
tReqId=945665717&fastPos=1 (last visited Jan. 24, 2011), cited in O. Moréteau & C.
Pellerin-Rugliano, Damage Caused by Less Than All Possibly Harmful Events Outside the
Victim’s Sphere: France, in DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, § 6a/6.
65. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], Jan. 14,
1971, J.C.P. 1971, II, 16733 (Fr.). See also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme
court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Sept. 24, 2009, Bull. civ. I, No. 187 (Fr.) for a
recent application of this jurisprudence to a DES claim.
66. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 A.C. 32. This summary draws upon Ken
Oliphant, England and Wales, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2002, at 144 (Helmut Koziol
& Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2003).
67. It should be noted that English law has no system of workers’
compensation and freely allows injury claims against one’s employer under the
ordinary law of tort.
68. See Fairchild, [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 A.C. [124] (Lord Rodger).
69. See id. at [34] (Lord Bingham), [36] (Lord Nicholls).
70. Id. at [33] (Lord Bingham); see also id. at [39] (Lord Nicholls) (“The
unattractive consequence, that one of the hunters will be held liable for an injury
he did not in fact inflict, is outweighed by the even less attractive alternative, that
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causal connection would “empty the [defendant’s] duty of
71
content” by allowing him or her in many circumstances to expose
others unlawfully to risk without any fear of tortious liability. The
Law Lords viewed the resulting liability as exceptional, and
subjected it to various limitations to keep its scope in check—for
example, that the risk to which each defendant tortiously exposed
the claimant must involve the same or at least a similar causative
72
agency.
Four years later, the House of Lords was invited to decide two
questions not resolved in the Fairchild case: whether liability might
arise under the Fairchild principle when part of the worker’s
exposure to asbestos was during a period in which he or she was
self-employed, and so responsible for part of the risk, and the
appropriate quantum of each defendant’s liability under the
73
74
principle. In Barker v. Corus UK Ltd., which—like Fairchild—was a
case of mesothelioma from occupational exposure to asbestos, the
Law Lords unanimously confirmed the application of the Fairchild
principle even where part of the exposure was attributable to the
victim. On the quantum of liability, the Law Lords ruled that—in
all cases under the Fairchild rule, and not just where the victim had
contributed to the risk—each defendant’s liability should be
proportional to his or her contribution to the risk, and not joint
75
and several liability in the full amount of the claimant’s loss.
the innocent plaintiff should receive no recompense even though one of the
negligent hunters injured him.”); id. at [155] (Lord Rodger) (“In these
circumstances, one might think, in dubio the law should favour the claimants.”).
71. Id. at [62] (Lord Hoffmann); see also id. at [155] (Lord Rodger) (stating
that “if the law did indeed impose a standard of proof that no pursuer could ever
satisfy, then . . . employers could with impunity negligently expose their workmen
to the risk of dermatitis—or, far worse, of mesothelioma.”).
72. Id. at [170] (Lord Rodger) (“the same agency . . . [or] an agency that
operated in substantially the same way”). At paragraph 72, Lord Hoffmann stated
that there was “not . . . a principled distinction” between same agency and multiagency cases, but he later accepted that this was a minority opinion and wrong,
and that the alternative causal agents must operate in the same way. Barker v.
Corus UK Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572 [23]. For this reason, he did
not think that the exception applied when the “claimant suffer[ed] lung cancer
which may have been caused by exposure to asbestos or some other carcinogenic
matter but may also have been caused by smoking and it [could not] be proved
which [was] more likely to have been the causative agent.” Id. at [24].
73. Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572.
74. Id. This summary draws upon Ken Oliphant, England and Wales, in
EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2006, at 162 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds.,
2008).
75. Lord Rodger (dissenting) would have imposed full joint and several
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Although the balance of justice and injustice fell in favour of
allowing the claimant some remedy, this did not mean that the
injustice to the defendant was negligible. Proportional-liability was
a way to “smooth the roughness of the justice” which would
76
otherwise result.
That was not, however, the end of the story, as the decision
provoked an immediate outcry from the labour movement, and
within a matter of weeks Parliament had intervened to restore joint
77
and several liability by way of the Compensation Act 2006. The
78
reinstated solitary liability is limited to mesothelioma cases. In
theory, proportional-liability remains the rule in all other cases
under the Fairchild principle, but the Act has made it the (likely to
be rare) exception in practice.
Both the European harmonisation projects—the PETL and
the DCFR—would also impose liability in alternative-defendant
cases, though they differ in the quantum of liability imposed on
individual defendants. The DCFR contains a provision rather
similar to section 830(1) of the German Civil Code, with a
rebuttable presumption of (factual) causation “[w]here legally
relevant damage may have been caused by any one or more of a
number of occurrences for which different persons are accountable
and it is established that the damage was caused by one of these
79
occurrences but not which one . . . .”
As in Germany, each
defendant’s liability is joint and several in the full amount of the
plaintiff’s loss. By contrast, the PETL propose a proportional
liability. Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572, [91].
76. Id. at [43] (Lord Hoffmann).
77. Compensation Act, 2006, c. 29, § 3 (U.K.). A responsible person has a
joint and several liability for mesothelioma suffered by a victim if four conditions
are satisfied:
(a) a person (“the responsible person”) has negligently or in breach of
statutory duty caused or permitted another person (“the victim”) to be
exposed to asbestos, (b) the victim has contracted mesothelioma as a
result of exposure to asbestos, (c) because of the nature of mesothelioma
and the state of medical science, it is not possible to determine with
certainty whether it was the exposure mentioned in paragraph (a) or
another exposure which caused the victim to become ill, and (d) the
responsible person is liable in tort, by virtue of the exposure mentioned
in paragraph (a), in connection with damage caused to the victim by the
disease (whether by reason of having materially increased a risk or for
any other reason).
Id. § 3(1). A deduction for contributory negligence may be made if the victim was
culpably responsible for any part of the exposure. Id. §3(3)(b).
78. See id. § 3(1).
79. DCFR, supra note 3, art. 4:103.
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outcome in such cases:
In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone
would have been sufficient to cause the damage, but it
remains uncertain which one in fact caused it, each
activity is regarded as a cause to the extent corresponding
to the likelihood that it may have caused the victim’s
80
damage.
This remains as yet a minority approach in Europe, where even
the theory of market-share liability has yet to gain a foothold.
Indeed, when market-share liability was urged on the Dutch
Supreme Court in the course of the worldwide DES litigation, it was
decisively rejected, the Court preferring to reverse the burden of
proof and to impose joint and several liability as a market-share
approach leaving the victims, not the producers, with the risk that a
producer might be insolvent or untraceable, or have ceased to
81
exist. The controversy attending the application of proportionalliability in alternative-defendant cases is also clearly demonstrated
by the rapid parliamentary intervention following the English
House of Lords’ adoption of proportional-liability in its Barker
82
decision of 2006. Nevertheless, it is hard to dispute the argument
of the PETL’s framers that there are “no compelling reason[s] to
justify why someone should pay for the whole of a loss which he
possibly . . . did not bring about[,]” while “[o]n the other hand, it
83
would be harsh to leave the victim empty-handed.”
As to the case where the plaintiff culpably contributes to the
risk, the European systems do not speak with a single voice. As
noted above, the victim’s contribution to the risk of harm does not
prevent liability arising in English law, or under the PETL, but it is
fatal to a claim in German law. A strong argument in favour of
liability in such a case is that the plaintiff’s contribution, if proved,
does not (where comparative negligence is the rule, as is universal
in Europe) prevent another person from being liable, albeit for
only a portion of the loss; so why should the plaintiff be denied a
84
claim altogether when his or her contribution is uncertain?
80. PETL, supra note 3, art. 3:103(1).
81. Hoge Raad, 9 October 1992, NJ 1994, 535, noted in W.H. van Boom & I.
Giesen, Damage Caused by Less Than All Possibly Harmful Events Outside the Victim’s
Sphere: Netherlands, in DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, § 6a/8; English
extracts may be found in VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 35, § 4.NL.44.
82. Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C [91].
83. PETL, supra note 3, art. 3:103, cmt. 3.
84. This was one of the arguments for introducing proportional-liability in
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C. Uncertain Torts
Where American courts, through adoption of market-share
liability, have arguably been more creative than their European
equivalents in dealing with the challenges of alternative-defendant
cases, the roles are perhaps reversed in the uncertain-tort scenario.
European systems have developed a range of approaches to ensure
deserving plaintiffs are not defeated by rigid adherence to
traditional rules. Such developments include approaches that are
also found in the United States—especially the reversal of the
burden of proof and damages for loss-of-chance—as well as the
comparatively new theory of proportional-liability effected through
a modification of the orthodox rules of factual causation, rather
than by a re-conceptualizion of the harm. These three devices—
reversal of the burden of proof, damages for loss-of-chance, and
proportional-liability—will now be considered in turn.
1. Reversal of the Burden of Proof
Several European systems provide, in limited circumstances,
for a reversal of the normal burden of proof, or some functionally
equivalent relaxation of the normal requirements of proof, to
transfer the risk of uncertain causation from the innocent plaintiff
to the guilty defendant.
In Germany, the burden of proof may be reversed in a
number of specific circumstances, including where there is a
violation of a protective statute (Schutzgesetz) or breach of a
judicially-recognized safety duty (Verkehrspflicht) and the harm is
85
one that the duty was designed to guard against.
The most
significant application of the technique is in claims of medical
86
malpractice where gross negligence is established. In such cases,
Austrian law. See infra Part III.C.3.b.
85. For a short overview in English, see VAN DAM, supra note 35, at 281–83.
86. See, e.g., R. Zimmerman & J. Kleinschmidt, Loss of a Chance: Germany, in
DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, at 548–49 (citing Bundesgerichtshof
[BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 11, 1968, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2291, 1968 (Ger.)). For a general discussion, see Gottfried
Schiemann, Problems of Causation in the Liability for Medical Malpractice in German
Law, in CAUSATION IN LAW 187, 187–98 (Luboš Tichý ed., 2007); see also STAUCH,
supra note 52, at 87–92 (“[T]he most significant development in the proof of
treatment malpractice cases has occurred with respect to gross treatment errors . . .
. Indeed, this comprises one of the most original and defining features of German
medical malpractice law overall.”). The mistake must not be one that even a
careful and conscientious doctor might make on occasion, but one that the doctor
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it is enough that the doctor creates or adds more than a minimal
risk of harm, even if this is considerably smaller than the risk from
alternative (innocent) factors. For example, in the leading case
liability was imposed for misdiagnosis even though, according to
experts, there was only a ten percent chance that proper treatment
87
would have prevented the ensuing disability. It should be recalled
that proof in German law requires the judge’s full conviction that
the factual matters alleged are true, and if material doubt remains,
88
it is not enough that they are probably true.
In France, a similar outcome can be achieved through the
courts’ reliance upon evidential presumptions. It has been
suggested that these presumptions play an especially large role in
French civil law in order to compensate for the “fact avoidance”
89
that is a characteristic feature of French civil procedure, as evident
in its preference for written proofs and its general reluctance to
90
order discovery (i.e. the disclosure of evidence). According to the
Code civil, the term refers to the drawing of inferences from what is
91
known as to what is unknown. It applies both to the (frequently
92
irrebuttable) presumptions of law laid down by statute or
established by the Cour de cassation, and the commonsense
presumptions of fact made by the courts in the exercise of their
sovereign discretion, subject only to the condition that such

simply ought not make. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May
10, 1983, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2080 (2081), 1983, quoted in
STAUCH, supra note 52, at 88.
87. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 27, 2004, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2011, 2004, noted in STAUCH, supra note 52, at
89–90.
88. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
89. James Beardsley, Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure, 34 AM. J. COMP. L.
459, 469–70 (1986) (noting as a justification for this characteristic the
“economizing of judicial resources”).
90. Id.
91. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1349 (Fr.); see also PHILIPPE BRUN, RESPONSABILITÉ
CIVILE EXTRACONTRACTUELLE ¶ 248 (2d ed. 2009); Suzanne Galand-Carval,
Aggregation and Divisibility of Damage in France: Tort Law and Insurance, in
AGGREGATION AND DIVISIBILITY OF DAMAGE, 154–55 (Ken Oliphant ed., 2009); VINEY
& JOURDAIN, supra note 63, § 363; Philippe Pierre, Les présomptions relatives à la
causalité, REVUE LAMY DROIT CIVIL, July–August 2007, Supplement to No 40, p 39 ff.
For overviews in English, see KHOURY, supra note 46, at 144–46; VAN DAM, supra
note 35, at 283–84; Duncan Fairgrieve & Florence G’sell-Macrez, Causation in
French Law: Pragmatism and Policy, in PERSPECTIVES IN CAUSATION (Richard Goldberg
ed., forthcoming 2011).
92. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 1350, 1352.
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presumptions of fact should be serious, precise and concurrent.
Formally, only presumptions of law entail a reversal of the burden
of proof, presumptions of fact being made on the basis of the
court’s evaluation of the evidence in the round.
Both legal and factual presumptions have played a significant
role in allowing the imposition of liability in cases of uncertain
factual causation. An example of the former is provided by a
decision of the Cour de cassation in 2001, laying down a presumption
of causality where the victim was infected with the hepatitis C virus
following a blood transfusion in circumstances where there was no
94
indication of viral contamination from any other source. This was
95
enacted in statutory form the following year. The court has since
confirmed that the claimant need only establish a possibility, not a
probability, of causation. So, where the victim was found to have
been infected following his triple heart bypass, but there were four
possible theories to account for the infection—infection prior to
the operation, the bypass itself, other invasive procedures before
and after the operation, or some later cause—the presumption of
causality was raised by the mere possibility that the victim could
have been infected by blood products administered during the
96
procedure.
Presumptions of fact may also play an important role in
allowing proof of causation notwithstanding uncertainty about what
actually occurred. In a recent series of cases, the Cour de cassation
has accepted that a causal link may be established between hepatitis
B vaccinations and the subsequent onset of multiple sclerosis on
the basis of serious, precise and concurrent presumptions—that is,
presumptions of fact within the sovereign discretion of the firstinstance judge—notwithstanding widely divergent opinions in the
scientific community and the lack of conclusive statistical data as to

93. Id. art. 1353.
94. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
May 9, 2001, Bull. civ. I, No. 130 (Fr.); see also VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 63, §
367–71.
95. See article 102 of Loi 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des
maladies et à la qualité du système de santé [Law 2002-303 of March 4, 2002
relating to patients’ rights and the quality of the healthcare system], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], March
5, 2002, p. 4118.
96. See Galand-Carval, supra note 91, at 155–56 n.7 (quoting Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., July 12, 2007, Bull.
civ. I, No. 272 (Fr.)).
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97

the vaccine’s toxicity.
What all such approaches have in common is that they
preserve the traditional all-or-nothing rule, and in cases where
causation is truly uncertain, they risk injustice to either the plaintiff
or the defendant. The all-or-nothing rule is also arbitrary because
very small changes in the probability that the defendant’s
wrongdoing caused the harm have drastic effects on the plaintiff’s
entitlement to damages. All-or-nothing also allows defendants to
systematically evade liability when the risks for which they are
responsible, relative to alternative risks, are consistently too low to
tip the balance of probabilities, and thus undermines the deterrent
98
effect of tortious liability.
2. Damages for Loss-of-Chance
Dissatisfaction with the all-or-nothing rule is apparent in
several national systems’ techniques of awarding damages for lossof-chance. As in the Third Restatement, it is generally accepted
that this approach involves a redefinition of the damage that can
99
ground a claim and not a change of the principles of causation.
Loss-of-chance analysis is accepted in one form or another in most
100
European systems,
though its application to physical injury
cases—as in the classic case of medical negligence reducing a
patient’s chances of recovery—is mostly limited to nations in the
101
Romantic legal tradition like France, Belgium, and Spain.
In France, loss-of-chance has been considered compensable
damage since the nineteenth century, but it was not until the 1960s

97. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
May 22, 2008, Bull. civ. I, Nos. 147, 148, 149.
98. For powerful judicial criticism of the all-or-nothing approach, see Lord
Nicholls’s dissenting opinion in the English case Gregg v. Scott, where the majority
rejected the loss-of-chance approach that Lords Nicholls supported. [2005] 2 A.C.
176 (H.L.) 179–80 (Lord Nicholls) (U.K.). In his dissent, Lord Nicholls argued
that the greater the uncertainty about causation, the less attractive the traditional
all-or-nothing approach becomes, describing the latter as “crude to an extent
bordering on arbitrariness.” Id. at 190.
99. See, e.g., H. Koziol, Loss of a Chance: Comparative Report, in DIGEST: NATURAL
CAUSATION, supra note 36, at 589–91 (“It is felt that this problem is not really a
causal one but rather a problem concerning the evaluation of the lost opportunity
which constitutes the damage.”).
100. See id.; VAN DAM, supra note 35, at 293–97; Thomas Kadner Graziano, Loss
of a Chance in European Private Law, 16 EUR. REV. OF PRIVATE L. 1009, 1023–27
(2008).
101. See generally DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, at ch. 10.
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that it was applied in the context of the lost chance of recovery or
102
survival from an injury or medical condition. The starting point
for this development was an unreported decision of the cour d’appel
103
(court of appeal) of Grenoble in 1961. Following an injury to her
wrist, the plaintiff was x-rayed but her doctor failed to see (as was
clearly visible) that she had sustained a fracture; the plaintiff
104
consequently resumed her normal activities.
Several years later,
she experienced pain while handling a heavy object and consulted
105
another doctor, who discovered the break. In her action against
the first doctor, the court found that if the first diagnosis had been
correct, this would have allowed the plaintiff to receive treatment
that would have prevented the continuing sensitivity in her wrist,
and her non-treatment had therefore deprived her of a chance of
106
In another case shortly afterwards, this loss-of-chance
cure.
107
analysis was adopted by the Cour de cassation.
The eight-year-old
108
claimant broke and dislocated his elbow in a fall. The defendant
doctor negligently diagnosed only the fracture; the dislocation
109
came to light later.
It was disputed what effect was to be
110
attributed to the consequent delay in appropriate treatment. The
court found that the defendant’s fault deprived the claimant of a
111
chance of recovery for which he was entitled to compensation. It
was subsequently clarified that this analysis permitted only partial
112
Despite criticism from some
compensation for the injury.
commentators, liability for the loss of a chance of recovery is now

102. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 63, §§ 280, 369–71. For an English language
account, see KHOURY, supra note 46, at 110–14.
103. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 63, § 370 (discussing Cour d’appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal] Grenoble, Oct. 24, 1961, RTD civ. 1963, 334).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See KHOURY, supra note 46, at 110 (discussing Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] le civ., Dec. 14, 1965, Bull. civ. I, No. 541).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. (“The Court of Appeal, with whom the Cour de cassation agreed,
nevertheless granted the claim on the ground that serious, precise, and
concordant presumptions showed that the boy’s damage was the direct
consequence of the defendant’s fault.”).
112. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 63, § 370 n.175 (citing Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Mar. 27, 1973, JCP 1974, II, 17643,
note R. Savatier, and Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] May 9, 1973, JCP 1974, II, 11643, note R. Savatier).
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113

firmly entrenched in French law.
114
In Belgium, loss of medical chance cases date back to 1984,
115
but a period of uncertainty ensued before the Cour de Cassation
conclusively recognised the theory in 2008 in a case concerning the
loss of the claimant’s horse after negligent treatment by its
veterinarian, approving a discounted award to reflect the horse’s
116
eighty percent pre-treatment survival chance.
In the same year,
the Tribunal Supremo, Spain’s high court, also adopted a loss-ofchance analysis in a case where there was a delay in making
available a decompression chamber following the claimant’s diving
117
Previously, the Spanish courts had used the loss-ofaccident.
chance concept in a modified form, valuing the lost chance as an
immaterial injury in itself and not applying a percentage discount
to the “full” damages—it has been claimed that the concept was
118
“correctly used” for the first time in a diving accident case. The
Tribunal Supremo found that the claimant had been deprived of the
opportunity of joining the 71.5% of those suffering similar injuries
who, when treated on time, would recover in full, but—
notwithstanding the apparent statistical precision—awarded a
119
round € 90,000 in damages.
113. The authors of the leading modern text on French civil law express
themselves “loin d’être convaincus”—“far from convinced”—by the loss-of-chance
theory, preferring full compensation on the basis of a presumption of causality
between medical fault creating an unjustified risk of damage and damage resulting
within the scope of that risk. Id. § 371.
114. See Isabelle C. Durant, Loss of a Chance: Belgium, in DIGEST: NATURAL
CAUSATION, supra note 36, at 556–58 (analyzing Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Court
of Cassation], Jan. 19, 1984, PAS. 1984, I, No. 548 (Belg.) (holding a doctor eighty
percent liable for failing to detect gangrene, which caused the amputation of a
patient’s leg)).
115. See id. at 558–60 (noting a 2004 Belgian high court holding refusing to
apply the loss-of-chance theory in a case involving the failure of the local police
and prosecutor to investigate or protect a victim from her ex-boyfriend, and
stating that “[s]ince the Supreme Court pronounced [this decision], the question
has arisen whether the court still admits the concept of the loss of a chance”); see
also Isabelle C. Durant, Une Brève Histoire de la Théorie de la Perte d’une Chance en Droit
Belge, HAVE/REAS, Jan. 2008, at 72, 75–76.
116. Isabelle C. Durant, Belgium, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, supra note 43, at
153–55.
117. Jordi Ribot & Albert Ruda, Spain, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, supra note
43, at 597, 610–11 (discussing S.T.S., July 7, 2008 (R.J., No. ###, p. 6872) (Spain)).
118. Id. at 612.
119. Id. at 611 (“[H]e is not compensated for hypothetical detriment . . . but
for real, true and effective damage . . . . For these reasons, and taking into account
the age of the victim . . . , his profession, and the nature of the sequelae resulting
from the loss-of-chance, [€ 90,000 is appropriate].”).
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The award of damages for loss-of-chance is expressly
120
contemplated in the DCFR, but the theory’s application in
121
122
physical harm cases is rejected in England and Germany.
The loss-of-chance analysis is criticised because it addresses the
deficiencies of the all-or-nothing approach only by introducing
123
uncertainty into the legal concept of damage. It is also prone to
divert attention away from the substantive merits of imposing some
liability on the facts, and tends toward arid discussion of whether
what was lost was sufficiently “concrete” to count as actionable
damage or whether a diminished, but not totally lost, chance is
124
Ultimately the loss-of-chance theory is incoherent
sufficient.
because almost everyone accepts that the right to damages accrues
only when the actual injury is suffered and not when the chance of
125
avoiding the injury is reduced.

120. The other European harmonisation project prefers proportional-liability
through the modification of the normal approach to factual causation. See infra
Part III.C.3.a; see also Bernhard A. Koch, Principles of European Tort Law, 20 K.L.J.
203, 209–10 (2009).
121. See Gregg v. Scott, [2005] 2 A.C. 176 (H.L.); Hotson v. E. Berkshire Area
Health Auth., [1987] A.C. 750 (H.L.).
122. See Zimmerman & Kleinschmidt, supra note 86, at 548–49 (citing
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 11, 1968, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2291, 1968 (Ger.) for the proposition that a
claimant “cannot discharge the onus of proof since there was, at most, a chance of
being cured”); see also STAUCH, supra note 52, at 91–92 (noting that the interest in
allowing proportionate recovery for loss-of-chance has not “figured in the case
law”). For an argument that English and German law should both accept the lossof-chance theory, see Nils Jansen, The Idea of a Lost Chance, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 271, 288–93 (1999).
123. See, e.g., Koziol, supra note 99, at 590–91 (“If the chance has no economic
value, redefining the damage encounters difficulties because the loss of this
chance cannot be qualified as recognisable damage which can be compensated.”).
124. Id. at 591.
125. See id. The same objection applies if it is the plaintiff’s exposure to risk
that is treated as the actionable injury, as in English law under the House of Lords’
Fairchild jurisprudence. See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text. For some
of the Law Lords, namely Lord Hoffmann, Lord Scott, and Lord Walker, the basis
of the liability under Fairchild was the wrongful creation of the risk or chance of
mesothelioma. Barker v. Corus UK Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572
(Eng.). This analysis was expressly rejected by Baroness Hale and Lord Rodger.
Id. at 605–606, 615. The approach seems difficult to reconcile with the clear
statements in the judgment that liability accrues only after the risk materialises,
and not before. E.g., id. at 578.
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126

An alternative approach, which also leads to partial
compensation in respect of the physical harm, is effected by a
number of European systems by modifying the traditional
approach to causation so as to produce proportional-liability. This
remains a minority approach, but it has gained impetus as a result
of recent developments in a number of European jurisdictions. It
is also the approach proposed by the PETL.
a. Principles of European Tort Law
The express aim of the European Group on Tort Law’s
Principles is “to serve as a basis for the enhancement and
127
harmonisation of the law of torts in Europe.”
Neither
enhancement nor harmonisation is given priority. The PETL are
128
not a “restatement” of an existing status quo. They do not simply
endorse the lowest common denominator in the tort laws of
European systems, or even the majority view, but look to the
optimal approach; in particular areas they propose novel or (as yet)
only minority solutions to problems where prevailing national
129
approaches are deemed deficient.
A case in point is
proportional-liability, especially in its application to uncertain-cause
situations. As already noted, the PETL provide for proportionalliability even in alternative-defendant cases, where most European
systems, like the restatements in the United States, maintain the allor-nothing approach, albeit with a reversal in the burden of
130
proof.
Article 3:106 of the PETL extends the approach to cases
of uncertain causes partly within the victim’s sphere: “The victim
has to bear his loss to the extent corresponding to the likelihood
that it may have been caused by an activity, occurrence or other

126. This section draws on the author’s previously published work: Ken
Oliphant, Alternative Causation: A Comparative Analysis of Austrian and English Law,
in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT KOZIOL ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 795, 795–812 (P. Apathy,
R. Bollenberger, P. Bydlinski, G. Iro, E. Karner & M. Karollus eds., 2010)
[hereinafter Oliphant, Alternative Causation], and Ken Oliphant, Proportional
Liability, in INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, VOL. 1, 179 (B. Verschraegen ed., 2010).
127. PETL, supra note 3, at 16 No. 30. For a short introductory account, see
Koch, supra note 120.
128. PETL, supra note 3, at 16 No. 31.
129. Id. at 16 Nos. 30–32.
130. Id. art. 3:103(1).
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131

circumstance within his own sphere.”
Under this rule, if a patient were to fall ill after receiving
inadequate medical care, but the illness could well have a natural
cause, the doctor is liable to the extent that his or her malpractice
132
may have caused the illness.
It is also envisaged that the rule
133
could be applied in a toxic tort scenario. The PETL commentary
accepts—with something of a degree of understatement—that this
proportional-liability approach “is not (entirely) in line with the
134
common core.”
In fact, if one distinguishes it (as one should)
from the technique of awarding damages for loss-of-chance,
proportional-liability as envisaged by the PETL was accepted at the
time of their publication only in Austrian law. However, as
135
136
subsequent developments in English
and Dutch
law have
shown, proportional-liability may well be an idea whose time has
come.
137

b. Austrian Law

Proportional-liability was introduced into Austrian law as an
equitable solution to cases of alternative causation where one of the
possible causes lies in the victim’s sphere (alternative Kausalität mit
Zufall) and liability cannot be established on the normal standard
138
of proof —variously described as a probability bordering on a
131. Id. art. 3:106.
132. Id.; see also id. at 58 No. 13.
133. See, e.g., id. at 58 No. 11 (describing a scenario in which a percentage of
residents in a small town fall ill due to negligent emissions). A “toxic tort” is a
“civil wrong arising from exposure to a toxic substance, such as asbestos, radiation,
or hazardous waste.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (9th ed. 2009).
134. PETL, supra note 3, art. 3:102; see also id. at 46 No. 9 (parenthesis in
original). For a discussion on proportional-liability in the PETL generally, see id.
at 46 No. 8. The PETL Commentary also accepts that liability in cases of
alternative causation involving possible non-tortious causes is “quite a step” for
some systems and it urges caution in at least some cases in this category (e.g., “new
risks” discovered through scientific progress, where litigation may relate to
activities which took place long ago). Id. art. 3:106; see also id. at 57 Nos. 8–9.
135. See infra Part III.C.3.c.
136. See infra Part III.C.3.d.
137. For an English language overview, see Oliphant, Alternative Causation,
supra note 126.
138. Liability in such circumstances was first suggested by Wilburg before
being fully theorised by F. Bydlinski, whose analysis was subsequently adopted by
Koziol. See WALTER WILBURG, DIE ELEMENTE DES SCHADENSRECHTS 74 (1941) (Ger.);
Franz Bydlinski, Haftungsgrund und Zufall als alternativ mögliche Schadensursachen, in
AKTUELLE PROBLEME DES UNTERNEHMENSRECHTS: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GERHARD FROTZ
ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 3 (M. Enzinger, H.F. Hügel & W. Dillenz eds., 1993)
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certainty (beyond reasonable doubt), or, in the majority view, a
139
The Austrian Civil
standard of high or very high probability.
Code provides expressly for the analogical application of its
provisions in cases falling outside the natural interpretation of its
140
terms, and courts and scholars have exploited this latitude by
providing first for joint and several liability in alternative-defendant
cases, and then for the further extension of liability—though only
141
on a proportional basis—to uncertain-tort scenarios.
The
reasoning is underpinned by the theory of a flexible system
142
developed by the Austrian legal theorist, Walter Wilburg.
In a
flexible system, a weakness in a given claim corresponding to one
element of liability can be offset by showing unusual strength
relative to another element of liability. It may be argued, therefore,
that the existence of a merely possible causal nexus should not
preclude liability where this can be set off against an unusual
degree of foreseeability of damage, i.e., where the defendant’s
unlawful and culpable conduct posed not just the normally
required risk of harm but a concrete dangerousness (konkrete
143
Gefährlichkeit).
This extension of (proportional) liability to uncertain-tort
cases has been accepted by the Austrian Supreme Court—though
144
not without exception—in decisions from 1990 on. In a decision
(Austria); Franz Bydlinski, Causation as a Legal Phenomenon, in CAUSATION IN LAW 7,
18 (L. Tichý ed., 2007) (Czech); Franz Bydlinski, Aktuelle Streitfragen um die
alternative Kausalität, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GÜNTHER BEITZKE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 3, 30
(O. Sandrock ed., 1979) (Ger.); HELMUT KOZIOL, GRUNDFRAGEN DES
SCHADENERSATZRECHTS 140–44 (2010) (Austria); HELMUT KOZIOL, ÖSTERREICHISCHES
HAFTPFLICHTRECHT para. 3/36 (3rd ed. 1997) (Austria); Franz Bydlinski, Haftung bei
alternativer Kausalität, Juristische Blätter [JBL] 1959, 1, 13 (Austria).
139. Ernst Karner, The Function of the Burden of Proof in Tort Law, in EUROPEAN
TORT LAW 2008, supra note 43, at 68.
140. See ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE]
JUSTIZGESETZSAMMLUNG [JGS] No. 946/1816, as amended, § 7 (Austria).
141. See Bydlinski, Causation as a Legal Phenomenon, supra note 138, at 22; see also
Kimmo Nuotio, Some Remarks on the General Philosophy of Causality and Its Relation to
Causation in Law, in CAUSATION IN LAW 27, 30 (L. Tichý ed., 2007) (Austria).
142. See Bydlinski, Causation as a Legal Phenomenon, supra note 138, at 13; see also
KOZIOL, ÖSTERREICHISCHES HAFTPFLICHTRECHT, supra note 138, para. 3/31.
143. See KOZIOL, ÖSTERREICHISCHES HAFTPFLICHTRECHT, supra note 138,
para. 3/33 (proposing the following test: if one were to disregard the other
potentially causal acts or omissions, would the defendant’s causation of the harm
be regarded as so probable, given the spatial and temporal relationship of his
conduct to the harm and its concrete dangerousness, that it would have to be
considered proven).
144. The theory is not limited to medical cases. See e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof
[OGH] [Supreme Court] June 4, 1993, docket No. 8 Ob 608/92, EVIDENZBLATT
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of particular interest, dating from 1995, the Court was faced with a
145
claim relating to the birth of an infant with cerebral palsy. This
was attributable either to his mother’s severe placental insufficiency
resulting from her inadequate medical care or asphyxiation
146
induced by the coiling of the child’s umbilical cord around him.
The Court ruled that, even if it could not be proved that the
asphyxiation by the umbilical cord could reasonably have been
prevented, and it transpired therefore that an equally probable
cause of the disability was a factor within the claimant’s sphere, he
147
should nevertheless be entitled to recover damages.
If it could
not be proved which potential cause was in fact effective, the loss
should be divided between the claimant and the defendants in
148
equal shares. As the Court explained:
In cases of alternative causation between the effects of
tortious conduct and chance, any other approach would
only produce outcomes that, by reason of their extremity,
would be unintelligible and unreasonable. One would be
driven to the conclusion that either the claimant recovers
nothing because of his inability conclusively to determine
which of the two factors was in fact causal, or that the
defendant is held fully liable even though no causal link
between his conduct and the injured claimant has been
established. Both extremes are inconsistent with the basic
149
principles of Austrian tort law.

RECHTSMITTELENTSCHEIDUNGEN [EvBl] 1994/13, in 49 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 94
(1994) (Austria). English annotation by B.A. Koch, Alternative Causes, Including
Events Within the Victim’s Sphere: Austria, in DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note
36, § 6b/3, 395–97 (noting injuries from blows initially in self-defence but then in
retaliation; uncertain which injuries resulted from which blow).
145. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Nov 7, 1995, docket No. #
Ob 554/95, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES ÖSTERREICHINSCHEN OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES IN
ZIVILSACHEN [SZ] 68/207, in JBl 1996, 181 (Austria) (English annotation by Koch,
supra note 144, § 6b/3, 397–98).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id.; see also KOZIOL, ÖSTERREICHISCHES HAFTPFLICHTRECHT, supra note
138, para. 3/36. Koziol further argues that the weight of the ground of attribution
should be reflected in the apportionment. See id. para. 3/38.
DER
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150

As noted above, liability for material contribution to risk was
recognised by the House of Lords in its Fairchild v. Glenhaven
Funeral Services decision of 2002, subject to the requirement that the
possible causes of the plaintiff’s injury should be of the same (or at
151
least similar) type.
The facts of the case fit into the alternativedefendant category, but the Law Lords’ analysis went beyond this.
It was an explicit part of their reasoning that liability might also
arise where one of the possible causes was non-tortious, for they
stated that the same principle also supported and explained their
previous decision, dating from 1972, in the much debated case of
152
McGhee v. National Coal Board. This was a case of exposure to risk,
part of which was tortious, and part non-tortious. The uncertaintort situation was thus treated as equivalent to the case of
alternative-defendants. This analysis was confirmed in Barker v.
153
Corus (UK) plc, where McGhee was explained as a case of Fairchild
154
liability “avant la lettre”.
The Law Lords ruled that it was
“irrelevant whether the other exposure was tortious or nontortious, by natural causes or human agency or [as on the facts] by
155
the claimant himself.”
Although the injustice of denying the
claimant a remedy was weaker in such a case than where his injury
must have been caused by another person’s breach of duty, even if
it could not be shown whose, the balance of fairness was still in
156
favour of the imposition of liability.
However, although the
balance of justice and injustice fell in favour of allowing the
claimant some remedy, this did not mean that the injustice to the
defendant was negligible. Proportional-liability was a way to
“smooth the roughness of the justice” which would otherwise

150. See generally MARK LUNNEY & KEN OLIPHANT, TORT LAW: TEXT AND
MATERIALS 230, 230–48 (4th ed. 2010). It may be noted that English common law
recognises proportional-liability in both alternative-defendant and uncertain-tort
scenarios, though (full) joint and several liability has been imposed in
mesothelioma cases by section 3 of the Compensation Act, supra note 77. Id. at
243–44.
151. See Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs. Ltd. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1
A.C. 32, 32–33 (U.K.).
152. See id. at 36 (citing McGhee v. Nat’l Coal Bd. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1, [1972]
UKHL 7, [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008).
153. See [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572, 584–85.
154. See id. at 583 (Lord Hoffmann).
155. See id. at 585 (Lord Hoffmann).
156. See id. at 614 (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe).
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157

result.
As noted already, proportional-liability was quickly
restored in mesothelioma cases by Act of Parliament—in both
158
alternative-defendant and uncertain-cause situations.
The
apparent consequence is that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in
full even if only a small part of the exposure to asbestos was
159
tortious.
d. Law of the Netherlands
Coinciding almost exactly in point of time with the English
160
the Dutch Supreme Court also accepted
Barker decision,
proportional-liability in situations of alternative causation where
one of the possible causes lies within the victim’s sphere and causal
responsibility cannot be attributed to the defendant on the basis of
161
orthodox principles.
In Karamus/Nefalit, the claimant’s injury
was lung cancer, which—unlike mesothelioma—is frequently
162
triggered by factors quite independent of exposure to asbestos. A
157. Id. at 592 (Lord Hoffmann).
158. See Compensation Act 2006, supra note 77, § 3.
159. At the time of writing, the (new) United Kingdom Supreme Court had
heard, but not yet passed judgment in, the case of Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Ltd.,
[2009] EWCA (Civ) 1159, [2010] Q.B. 370 (Eng.). The deceased died of
mesothelioma in 2006. Id. at 373. Between 1966 and 1984 she had worked at a
steel-manufacturing factory owned by the defendant’s predecessors in title. Id. at
373–74. Although the deceased was an office worker, her duties took her all over
the factory premises, and she spent some time in areas that were on occasion
contaminated with asbestos. Id. at 374. Her exposure to asbestos in these periods
was later found to have been tortious (being in breach of either her employer’s
duty of care or its statutory duty). Id. She was probably not exposed to asbestos in
any other employment, but, in common with all other inhabitants of the heavily
industrialised area where she lived and worked, she was exposed to a low level of
asbestos in the general atmosphere. Id. It was found at trial, in an action brought
by the deceased’s daughter, that the total tortious exposure in the deceased’s
workplace was modest compared with the total environmental exposure and
increased the risk due to the environment by only 18% (i.e., 18% of the total
exposure was tortious and 82% was environmental exposure that was not proven
to be tortious). Id. at 375. The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s
argument that, in order to demonstrate causation, the claimant had to show that
the tortious exposure at least doubled the risk due to the environmental exposure,
and awarded her full compensation. Id. at 386–87. Whether this will be upheld by
the Supreme Court naturally remains to be seen.
160. Barker v. Corus UK Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572, was argued
on 13 and 14 March 2006, and judgment was handed down on 3 May 2006. The
Dutch decision described in the text was delivered on 31 March 2006.
161. Michael G. Faure & Ton Hartlief, The Netherlands, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW
2006, supra note 74, at 338, 347 (citing HR 31 maart 2006, RvdW 2006, 328
(Karamus/Nefalit) (Neth.)).
162. Id. at 348.
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number of alternative causes were considered: genetic
163
predisposition, the claimant’s smoking, and “background risk”.
These were all, of course, factors in the claimant’s sphere. It could
not be proven which of the possible causes, whether alone or in
164
combination, was in fact the cause of the claimant’s lung cancer.
The Dutch Supreme Court rejected an all-or-nothing approach,
which would have left the consequences of causal uncertainty
exclusively on either the employer or the employee:
Generally, it is, also regarding the scope of the protected
interest - preventing health damage of employees - and
the violation of the particular norm by the employer as
well as taking into account considerations of fairness and
equity, unacceptable that uncertainty concerning the
degree to which the wrongfulness of the employer
contributed to the damage of the employee would
completely be shifted to the employee.
. . . It is equally unacceptable, but in that case for the
employer, that even when the latter has violated his duty
of care towards the employee, that the result of causal
uncertainty would be completely shifted to the employer
notwithstanding the not very small likelihood that either
circumstances that are attributable to the employee (like
smoking, genetic constitution, or aging) or external
165
causes have caused the damage (as well).
The Court therefore opted instead for a proportional-liability
approach. It found the employer liable but reduced the damages
“to the extent to which circumstances which can be attributed to
166
the employee have also contributed to his damage.”
The effect of the decision is dramatic. It goes considerably
further than the English case-law, which allows a departure from
the but-for test in cases of alternative causation only where the
alternative factors are of the same or similar nature. In the
Netherlands, there is no such requirement. It is therefore
immaterial that the risks of cigarette smoking are manifestly not
the same as the risks of exposure to asbestos. Quite how this
jurisprudence will be developed in the future is, however, unclear:
It seems likely that its application will be assessed on a case-by-case
basis.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 349.
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CONCLUSIONS

In the English House of Lords’ Fairchild decision, Lord
Bingham noted the assistance he had derived from comparative
legal analysis of the issue under consideration:
Development of the law in this country cannot of course
depend on a head-count of decisions and codes adopted
in other countries around the world, often against a
background of different rules and traditions. The law
must be developed coherently, in accordance with
principle, so as to serve, even-handedly, the ends of
justice. If, however, a decision is given in this country
which offends one’s basic sense of justice, and if
consideration of international sources suggests that a
different and more acceptable decision would be given in
most other jurisdictions, whatever their legal tradition,
this must prompt anxious review of the decision in
question. In a shrinking world . . . there must be some
virtue in uniformity of outcome whatever the diversity of
167
approach in reaching that outcome.
This deserves to be considered a manifesto for comparative
legal scholarship. While Lord Bingham rightly warned against
reliance upon mathematics in place of analysis, he made clear that
comparative law has value both in highlighting problems that
deserve attention and in pointing towards possible solutions. The
present survey demonstrates that problems of uncertain factual
causation afflict all legal systems, and have widely been considered
to warrant the adoption of exceptional rules so as to avoid the
unacceptable outcomes that would otherwise arise. Lawyers
everywhere can learn useful lessons from the practical experiences
of other jurisdictions in developing such approaches. Europeans
can usefully learn from the American experience in developing
and refining a proportional-liability approach to alternativedefendant cases through the market-share theory. In return,
Americans may find inspiration in the new forms of proportionalliability recognised in several European jurisdictions, and also
adopted in the PETL, entirely independently of the loss-of-chance
167. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs. Ltd, [2002] UKHL 22, at [32],
[2003] 1 A.C. 32, 66 (U.K.). For further consideration of the benefits of
comparative analysis, see Ken Oliphant, Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd
(2002), in LANDMARK CASES IN THE LAW OF TORT 335 (Charles Mitchell & Paul
Mitchell eds., 2010). For a sceptical view, see Jane Stapleton, Benefits of Comparative
Tort Reasoning: Lost in Translation, 1 J. TORT L. 6 (2007).
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theory and its associated drawbacks. It seems to the present author
that such an approach may provide a more satisfactory mechanism
for addressing the problems created by uncertain-tort cases than to
trust in the finder of fact’s ability to reach a just outcome by
exploiting the flexibility inherent in the process of inferential
reasoning, and the indistinct line separating reasonable inferences
from impermissible speculation, as proposed by the Third
Restatement. That approach retains the traditional all-or-nothing
outcome, and thus falls prey to all the objections that can be made
against the all-or-nothing rule.
It is not, of course, the role of a “restatement” to search out
new theories from other systems and recommend their adoption by
domestic courts. Nevertheless, if the European experience with
proportional-liability takes root, flourishes, and begins to appeal to
courts and commentators in the United States, it is not far-fetched
to suggest that this approach to resolving problems of uncertain
factual causation may merit further consideration when it comes—
at whatever remote time in the future—to the preparation of the
Restatement (Fourth) of Torts.
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